deliberative democracy: All reasonable views should participate in and be satisfied with deliberation over public policy.
pragmatism: Swift implementation of the best available -- albeit imperfect -- course of action should not be delayed on the basis of purely ideological objections.
(And no, I'm not going to define `purely ideological' here.)
Due to your deliberative democratic views (and one or two auxiliary beliefs), you believe, in particular, that conservative Republican views should participate in and be satisfied with deliberation over economic stimulus. However, at the same time, due to your pragmatism, you think that implementing the best available course of action for stimulating the economy -- something like one of the three plans the Congress has approved over the past tenish days (new girlfriend + lots of schoolwork = I have no experience of the passing of time) -- should not be delayed on the basis of the purely ideological objections of laissez-faire conservative Republicans. To sharpen the example, let's stipulate that these conservatives will not be satisfied with deliberation over economic stimulus until their purely ideological objections have been met. (Much the same goes for libertarians and other fans of the free market that are not conservatives. But, for better or for worse, they don't have much presence in public deliberation in the first place. I think we should figure out what to do with the most pressing and obvious case first, and then move on to the harder cases.)
What the hell should you do? You can define `reasonable' such that the views of laissez-faire conservative Republicans turn out not to be reasonable. But that just sounds like watering down your commitment to deliberative democracy; you might as well just toss the latter, really.
This isn't just a one-time problem. Deliberative democracy and pragmatism will conflict whenever there are reasonable views that object to the best available course of action on purely ideological grounds; and this will be inevitable so long as there are reasonable views that make purely ideological objections. That is, deliberative democracy and pragmatism will come into conflict so long as there are reasonable views that reject pragmatism.
I don't have an answer to my question of two paragraphs ago. But I do think this is a good example of a genuine moral dilemma, at least for fans of Dewey.