Those who believe in a woman's right to control her own reproduction are rightly afraid of those who believe that fetuses deserve the same legal protection as born children, but these are not the only enemies of choice. More insidious is the opposition from 'pseudo-choicers' who believe abortion should be available - when they think it's appropriate.
Just as Henry Ford reputedly offered his customers 'any colour you want, as long as it's black', these 'pseudo-choicers' support a woman's right to choose, provided she makes a choice of which they approve. They agree that abortion is not murder, and they agree that the decision to end a pregnancy can be difficult - so difficult, in fact, that a foolish, hormonal woman cannot be trusted to make it alone.[...]
If the right to choose means anything at all, it has to include the right to make a choice that is incomprehensible to others. A woman's decision to end or continue a pregnancy doesn't need to make sense to anyone other than her; she is often the only person with all the information - knowledge of her own personality and wishes - necessary to understand it.
Not only is this a great first-person statement which my views on abortion and autonomy echo, but it ties into this post on moral relativism. I really should write a post on 'care' vs. 'virtue' ethics sometime, but I think the bolded paragraph summarizes 'care' ethics really well: the strict, universal moral laws of 'virtue' ethics just can't incorporate the particularities of each individual situation, which, according to 'care', 'feminist', or (I would say) 'existentialist' ethics, are necessary data for making a moral judgement. Hence, I can only be comfortable accepting the broadest moral laws as being truly binding -- ie, probably only the categorical imperative. Anything with more substantial content would have to be handled by the way the CI is applied by the individual making the decision.
I also want to point out that our legal system is grounded (at least partially) in 'virtue' ethics -- at least formally, the laws apply universally, to all members of society equally, and are always binding. This leads to a conflict with the most radically 'existentialist' or 'autonomal' versions of 'care' ethics: it may easily happen that the morally right decision involves breaking the law. Kierkegaard recognized this, or something very much like it, in what he called the 'religious' form of life, in which the individual transcends the limits of the 'ethical' form to achieve a higher good -- what he called 'a teleological suspension of the ethical'. Kierkegaard had Christianity in mind in particular (hence 'religious'), but you can see something similar in Nietzsche's ideal of the Ueberman, as an artist who's willing to transcend mediocritizing social mores in pursuit of artistic triumph. I haven't read Walden, or don't remember it if I did, but the standard gloss on Thoreau includes such ideas, too.
It's debatable how far to take this analogy, however: what Kierkegaard and Nietzsche seem to have in mind is something Beyond Good and Evil, while 'right', 'wrong', 'justice' and 'fairness' are moral concepts, and the justification for civil disobedience is that the state might pass unjust laws, which should in turn be defied.